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THE PEOPLE v. THE COURT:
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM AND THE
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
Douglas S. Reed'
INTRODUCTION 1
The fortieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education2
brings into sharp relief the difficulties courts have had effecting
significant social or political change. In school desegregation
suits, courts, by themselves, largely were unable to undo the
ravages of legally required separation of the races.3 Undaunted
by the federal judiciary's experience with school desegregation - and perhaps even inspired by it - state courts have em-

t A 1993-94 Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington,
D.C., Douglas S. Reed currently teaches Constitutional Law at Yale University.
' I am indebted to a number of individuals and institutions for their
support and assistance with the preparation of this article. The Brookings
Institution provided vital financial and research support, as did Yale University. The Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University graciously
provided me with polling data, and I am grateful to Mr. Rob Krebs for his
technical assistance in securing the data in a useable format. The New Jersey
Department of Education, Finance Division made available essential data files
for the quantitative analysis. I am especially thankful to Mr. Mel Wyns of the
Department of Education for his assistance. Val Heitshusen, Sarah Binder,
Dan Tichenor, Tom Burke, and Forrest Maltzmann offered methodological and
substantive advice, as did Professor Marty Gilens. Professors Rogers Smith
and David Mayhew offered their usual trenchant critiques.
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3

In the ten years between Brown and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d,
2000a et seq. (1988)), federal courts in the South confronted massive resistance to their efforts to integrate public schools. See BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN
YEARS OF PRELUDE (1964). In response, some courts gave up, while others
pushed harder. Compare Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (1955) (holding
that a state has no affirmative duty to integrate its schools but simply must
open the doors of White schools for voluntary attendance by Black children)
with United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (1966)
(holding that the state has an affirmative duty to integrate its school systems
into unitary, racially nondiscriminatory school systems). In either case, the
percentage of Black children attending school with White children in the
South did not increase above one percent until after the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. GERALD N. ROSEi4BERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 50 (1991). See
generally id. at 42-106.
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barked over the past twenty years on their own efforts to effect
dramatic changes in public education. These efforts focused not
on racial segregation but on the financing disparities among
school districts.4 Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in San

Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez5 that school
financing inequities do not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, state supreme courts in twentyeight states have ruled on school financing suits under the
provisions of their state constitutions. One half ruled in favor
of greater equity,6 while the other half ruled against it.7 These

4 See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II); Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood1); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977)
(Horton1); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (SerranoII); Robinson
v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson1).
5 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
6
See Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz.
1994); McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Tennessee Small Sch.
Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989)
(finding the existing scheme unconstitutional); Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d
1099 (Conn. 1985) (HortonI1) (imposing a greater burden of proof for plaintiffs' claim concerning the adequacy of reform); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No.
30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (overturning much
of Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974), which
did not rule in favor of greater equity); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn.
1977); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano11) (applying state
constitutional provisions); State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont.
1974) (finding that a modest equalization scheme was constitutional); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.
1971) (Serrano1) (held invalid under Rodriguez based on federal grounds).
7 See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (finding constitutional
a moderately egalitarian fimding mechanism that plaintiffs felt did not provide
sufficient revenues for inner-city districts); Richland County v. Campbell, 364
S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Fair Sch. Finance Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Britt v. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 affd, 361
S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d
758 (Md. 1983); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Lujan
v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813
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school finance decisions, which are part of a larger trend of
using state courts for the protection of civil rights under state
constitutions,8 have the potential to alter dramatically the fiscal
policy of numerous state governments. Specifically, these
decisions would affect both the amount of resources allocated to
public education and the political fights over those resources.
The legal community noted a number of these cases 9 but paid
little attention to the impact these decisions had either on the
actual distributions of funds within a state or on the political

divisions within the state. 10 This article examines the changes
(Ohio 1979); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Olsen v. State ex rel.
Johnson, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976)
(declaring unconstitutional a highly progressive funding mechanism that
redistributed tax revenues across districts); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d
635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (l. 1973); Milliken v. Green,
212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973).
' For background on this trend, see generally William J. Brennan Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 3
(1977); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day
of the Burger Court,62 VA. L. REV. 5 (1976); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and
IndependentState Grounds as a Means ofBalancingthe RelationshipBetween
State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977 (1985); Robert F. Williams,
Equality Guaranteesin State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985);
Robert F. Williams, Forward: The Importance of an Independent State
ConstitutionalEquality Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24
CoNN. L. REV. 675 (1992); Note, Developments in the Law: The Interpretation
of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982). But see James A.
Gardner, The FailedDiscourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L. REV.
761, 763 (1992) (arguing that "state constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements,"
and hence a poor forum for furthering individual rights).
' See, e.g., Jonathan Banks, State ConstitutionalAnalyses ofPublic School
FinanceReform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129 (1992);
Annette B. Johnson, State Court Intervention in School FinanceReform, 28
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 325 (1979); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact
of Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School
FinanceReform Litigation,19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990); William E. Thro, Note,
To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State ConstitutionalProvisions in
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L..REV. 1639 (1989); Note,
Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1072 (1991).
10 1 located only one study that directly assesses the effects of state
supreme court decisions across a number of states: G. Alan Hickrod, The
Effect of Constitutional Litigation on Education Finance: A Preliminary
Analysis, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 180 (1992). Unfortunately, this study has some
significant methodological problems. First, the school finance figures are not
adjusted for inflation; only constant figures are used. As the article compares
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in the distribution of funds wrought by the judiciary and the
political divisions over school financing in New Jersey. New
Jersey provides an exceptionally important case study of courtinitiated school finance reform because of the prominence of its
state supreme court" and the historical role that school financing battles have played in New Jersey fiscal policies.'
However, beyond the role school finance plays in New
Jersey's internal politics, the New Jersey Supreme Court's
constitutional treatment of school finance issues also has broad
implications for educational policy-making across the Nation.
According to the Education Commission of the States, twentytwo states either currently face school finance lawsuits or are
developing policy responses to recent trial and state Supreme
Court decisions.'" Thus, the example set by both the New
Jersey Supreme Court and the New Jersey state legislature
provides a template against which other states can evaluate
their own actions. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly in
this transformative political year, New Jersey's actions could
produce new national political leaders. At the time of his
election, many Democratic politicians and activists looked to
Jim Florio's policies as a possible source of renewal for the
Democratic party.' 4 Similarly, many Republicans today proclaim Christine Todd Whitman as the spark that ignited the
Republican gubernatorial brushfire last fall. 15 School financing
data over a fairly long time span (1970 to 1990), inflation could account for
much of the increase in educational expenditures by state and local government. Second, measures of school financing equity are used that precede state
supreme court decisions in Kentucky, Montana, Texas and New Jersey. This
data, then, cannot be used to evaluate the courts' effectiveness in those states.
11

See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIs PORTER, STATE SUPREME
COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 184-236 (1988), for an analysis of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's stature and influence among state supreme courts.
12

See RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 1-22 (1978).

1"Litigation is in progress in Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and South
Dakota. State legislatures or appeals courts are responding to state trial court
decisions in Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, Kansas, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming. MARY FULTON,
EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION LIST
(1994).
14 Peter Kerr, Read His Lips: More Taxes, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 20, 1990,
at 30.
" See Iver Peterson, Whitman: A Watural' in Helping the G.O.P., N.Y.
TIMEs, November 17, 1994, at B1.
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and its attendant issues of taxation and wealth distribution
proved to be Jim Florio's political undoing, and it also could dim
Whitman's political star. The New Jersey Supreme Court
handed down its third Abbott decision in July 1994, declaring
that the existing system still did not provide enough aid to New
Jersey's urban, special needs school districts. 6 Confronting
the same issue as Florio, Whitman also is caught between the
mandate of the court and the demands of the electorate. The
navigation of these treacherous political waters is an ordeal for
virtually every elected official confronted with the issue. In
order to fully understand this seemingly intractable political
dilemma, one must explore its roots in depth.
In no state has court-initiated school finance reform continued as long or as contentiously as it has in New Jersey. Beginning just thirteen days after the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973
decision in Rodriguez, 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court's involvement in school finance reform has produced ten supreme
court decisions," two major legislative overhauls of school
financing, 9 an income tax ° and, quite possibly, the electoral
defeat of at least one governor.2 ' However, despite this intense
involvement, the question remains whether the court has been
able to produce the elusive parity in school financing it has
sought for over twenty years.
This article examines the most recent efforts of the New
Jersey Supreme Court to achieve greater equity in school

6

Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 578-80 (N.J. 1994) (Abbott III).

U.S. 1 (1973).
" See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson1); Robinson
v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973) (RobinsonII); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d
6 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson III); Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)
(Robinson V); Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V);
Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976) (RobinsonVi); Robinson v. Cahill,
360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson VI); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 359 (N.J.
1985) (Abbott 1); Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d
575 (N.J. 1994) (Abbott III).
" See Public School Education Act of 1975, N.J. STAT. ANN. 18A:4A,7A,1-33
(West 1989); Quality Education Act of 1990, ch. 52, §§ 1-33, 1990 N.J. Laws
587-613 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7D-1 (West Supp. 1994)).
20 Homestead Property Tax Rebate Act of 1990, ch. 61, §§ 11-20, 1990 N.J.
Laws 671-678; See also LEHNE, supra note 12, at 126-163.
21 For a post-mortem account of Jim Florio's election woes, see generally
Frank Luntz & Mike Dabadie, Read Our Lips, No More Florio, CAMPAIGNS
1 411

AND ELEcTIONs, Dec. 1993, at 32.
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financing, and focuses on the years 1989 through 1994. It
argues that the efforts of the New Jersey Supreme Court to
define more narrowly the school finance issue in its 1990 Abbott
1I decision created a set of distributional winners and losers
that exacerbated existing tensions in New Jersey politics. In
the Abbott I1 decision, the court tried to focus more precisely on
what it perceived to be the worst constitutional wrongs of the
New Jersey educational financing system. However, in doing
so, the court rendered more remote its goal of achieving a
limited but meaningful parity. The taxes Governor Jim Florio
imposed to pay for school financing equalization and his efforts
to redistribute educational resources provoked a sharp political
backlash among voters and organized interests. This backlash,
in turn, forced the revision of Florio's school finance reform
effort and ultimately contributed to his own political demise.2 2
This article explores four threads of this story: 1) The
Abbott 11 decision itself; 2) the passage of the Quality Education
Act of 1990 (QEA) 23 and the political backlash against it; 3) the
nature and shape of popular attitudes towards Abbott 11 and the
QEA; and 4) the quantitative effects of Abbott 11 and the QEA
on school financing equality in New Jersey. Together, these
four threads of analysis explore the effects that courts, legislatures, interests, and popular opinion can have on both the
political outcomes of school financing disputes and the quantitative distribution of school funds.
These four strands have been broken down to illuminate
them. Part I examines the doctrinal evolution of the court from
the first Robinson v. Cahill2 4 decision in 1973 to the 1994
Abbott v. Burke25 decision. 6 Part II traces the policy response of the Florio administration to Abbott I - the QEA.
Part III explores public opinion concerning the QEA as it was
22 For an account of the relative importance of special interests and public

opinion in New Jersey politics, see generally BARBARA G. SALMORE & STEPHEN

A.

SALMORE, NEW JERSEY POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: SUBURBAN POLITICS

COMES OF AGE 87-105 (1993) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY POLITICS].
I Quality Education Act of 1990, ch. 52, §§ 1-33, 1990 N.J. Laws 587-613
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7D-1 to 18A:7D-37 (West Supp. 1994)).
2

303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson1).
643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) (Abbott II1).

26 However, the recent Abbott III largely reiterates and strongly reaffirms

the 1990 Abbott I decision. Because Abbott I represents the New Jersey
Supreme Court's most highly developed argument against the existing school
finance system, it will receive the bulk of my attention herein.
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originally passed and discusses various determinants or opposition to the act. In particular, Part HI examines the racial aspects of opposition to the QEA among New Jerseyans. In short,
the findings indicate that when analyzed as a whole, race was
not a salient predictor of opposition among all residents, but
that it was salient among parents of school-age children. Part
IV analyzes the political backlash against the QEA and the
political pressures that forced Florio to accept substantial
modifications to the QEA. Part V quantitatively determines
whether the New Jersey Supreme Court achieved its stated goal
of placing property-rich and property-poor districts, largely
urban and minority, on an equal footing. This part tracks three
measures of school financing equity over a six year period. The
results show that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions
had a notable impact on the distribution of funds among New
Jersey's schools. Finally, Part VI comments on the risks that
face the New Jersey Supreme Court as it strives to better the
educational opportunities of poor urban and minority districts.
The overall conclusion of this article is that the New Jersey
Supreme Court has had a significant and notable quantitative
effect on the redistribution of state aid to education, but these
modest victories cost the court its political allies. Thus, its
recent gains are threatened by its current lack of support in the
governor's office, in the legislature, and among the electorate at
large. The court won some early battles, but the political costs
were high - perhaps too high to sustain continued improvements in school finance equity.
I. THE TWIN SHADOWS OF ROBINSON
Two shadows loomed over the Abbott II decision handed
down by the New Jersey Supreme Court in June 1990: the language and logic of the Robinson v. Cahill series of decisions
decided in the mid-1970s, and the obvious failure of previous
court decisions to resolve adequately the school financing issue.
The former limited the range and play of the Abbott II decision,
while the latter animated the court's desire to resolve the issue
properly and finally.
The Robinson v. Cahill series of opinions (running from
Robinson I in 1973 through Robinson VII in 197627) marked

27

1 Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Robinson II, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J.
1975); Robinson III, 335 A 2d 6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson IV, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.
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the New Jersey Supreme Court's first efforts to tackle the issue
of school finance reform. The RobinsonI decision simultaneously heralded a new era of state court intervention in school
financing and signalled New Jersey's departure from the Supreme Court's analytical framework for adjudicating school
finance equity claims." But the Robinson I decision had a
longer-lasting impact on New Jersey school financing than the
rest of the Robinson litigation. As the original doctrinal basis
for the court's intervention, Robinson I meant that the New
Jersey Supreme Court could not easily abandon, or even modify,
its primary arguments.29

A. A BASIC STANDARD OF EDUCATION
The central analytical distinction of Robinson I was its
rejection of the fundamental rights approach of the U.S. Supreme Court and its heavy reliance on the "thorough and efficient" clause of the New Jersey Constitution." Because Robinson I declared that education was not a fundamental right
under the New Jersey Constitution, an equal protection analysis
became irrelevant to the issue of school financing.3 Instead,
the court viewed the constitutional mandate that the legislature
provide a "thorough and efficient" education as the central issue
of the litigation.32 The court chose to interpret a "thorough
and efficient" education not as an allocation of precisely equal
resources among students but as a mandate that the state

1975); Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Robinson Vt, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J.
1976); Robinson VII, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976).
' The U.S. Supreme Court's framework is articulated in San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Other interpretations of the
federal claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are applied in Parker v.
Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334
F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D.
Va. 1969); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968). Rodriguez
rendered these lower court interpretations under the Fourteenth Amendment
irrelevant.
' For a confirmation of Robinson's underlying analytical framework, see
Abbott v. Cahill, 575 A.2d 359, 367-71 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II).
30 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1.
" Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 282.
32

Id. at 294-95.
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As the court

[lt cannot be said the 1875 amendments were intended
to insure statewide equality among taxpayers. But we
do not doubt that an equal educational opportunity for
children was precisely in mind. The mandate that
there be maintained and supported "a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for the instruction
of all the children in the State between the ages of five
and eighteen years" can have no other import. Whether the State acts directly or imposes the role upon local
government, the end product must be what the Constitution commands. A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient
falls short of the constitutional command. Whatever
the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State's
to rectify it. If local government fails, the State government must compel it to act, and if the local government
cannot carry the burden, the State must itself meet its
continuing obligation. 4
This substantive interpretation of "thorough and efficient"
means, however, that the state constitution requires the state to
offer a minimum level of thoroughness and efficiency in education that changes with the economic and social expectations of
the times. 5 Contrasting the educational system of 1875 with
current standards, the unanimous court stated that "[t]oday, a
system of public education which did not offer high school
education would hardly be thorough and efficient."3 6
The New Jersey Constitution does not specify a required
level of education, and at the time of Robinson I neither the
legislative nor executive branches had attempted to define a
The court
constitutionally appropriate public education."
needed a standard by which to judge educational opportunities
in order to determine whether the financing system provided
"The
such an education.
It settled on the following:
"3Id. at 294.
Id.
35 Id. at 295.
3

36Id.
371d.

146

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND

PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:137

Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace that
educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary
his role as a citizen and as a competsetting to equip a child for
38
itor in the labor market.
In Robinson I, the court focused on financial disparities
among school districts because that was the only measure
available and because the court observed a common-sense
linkage between educational expenditures and the quality of
education. 39 Despite the emphasis placed on per pupil expenditures in Robinson I, the court did not view strict expenditure
equality as the sine qua non of a constitutional educational
system. Money is simply a convenient indicator of educational
opportunity, and it provides some measure of the quality of the
educational offering. As the court stated in Robinson I:
The trial court found the constitutional demand had not
been met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in
dollar input per pupil. We agree. We deal with the
problem in those terms because dollar input is plainly
relevant and because we have been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate. The constitutional mandate could
not be said to be satisfied unless we were to suppose
the unlikely proposition that the lowest level of dollar
performance happens to coincide with the constitutional
mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest level are
attributable to local decisions to do more than the State
was obliged to do.4"
In sum, in the Robinson I decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court was concerned with distancing itself from an equal
protection analysis based on fundamental rights. Instead, it
sought to provide a substantive educational content to the
"thorough and efficient" clause by requiring the state to ensure
that all students received sufficient educational opportunities to
become informed citizens and competitive workers in the labor
market.

3 Id.
39 Id.

40 Id.
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B. EQUAL COMPETITIVE FOOTING IN EDUCATION: ABBOTT II

The logic of Robinson I cast a shadow over the Abbott line
of decisions, primarily because Robinson I left unresolved the
question of what comprises a constitutionally adequate level of
education. In Abbott II the court determined that a constitutionally adequate level of education would exist if students from
all districts were placed on the same competitive plane.41 The
problem with this formulation, however, is that it creates a set
of distributional winners, exacerbating existing political tensions and rendering the objective of the court's decisions more
remote.
Early in the Abbott II decision, the court reexamined its
holding in Robinson 1, and stated that "the clear import [of
Robinson 1] is not of a constitutional mandate governing expenditures per pupil, equal or otherwise, but a requirement of a
'
specific substantive level of education."42
A few lines later the
court added:
The' State's obligation to attain that minimum [level of
education] is absolute - any district that fails must be
compelled to comply. If,
however, that level is reached,
the constitutional mandate is fully satisfied regardless
of the fact that some districts may exceed it. In other
words, the Constitution does not mandate equal expenditures per pupil.'
This completes the court's departure from equal protection
analysis. Expenditures are not the issue; instead, the provision
of a constitutional minimum is the central issue. The next
logical step, then, would be to identify those districts that fall
below the constitutional minimum, since those are the districts
where the state has failed to meet its constitutional obligation.
Instead, the court returned to Robinson !'s notion of educational opportunity as equality in labor market competition and
citizen development. 4" The court expanded upon this idea in
Abbott II by requiring the state to ensure that students from
poor, disadvantaged districts be placed on an equal competitive
41 Abbott

v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II).
42 Id. at 368.
43
Id.at 369.

4Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson 1).
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footing with students from advantaged areas.'
its holding in Abbott I, the court stated

Referring to

We said, in effect, that the requirement of a thorough
and efficient education to provide "that educational
opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a
competitor in the labor market," meant that poorer
disadvantaged students must be given a chance to be
able to compete with relatively advantaged students.
The Act and its system of education have failed in that
respect, and it is that failure that we address in this
case.

46

However, this is a far more rigorous standard than the one
articulated in Robinson L Under the Robinson formulation,
school districts (and the state) were obliged merely to equip
students with the basic principles of citizenship and to make
them employable.4" Under Abbott II, the disadvantaged must
be put in a position to compete effectively with the advantaged.48 In the court's view, this requires a compensatory
educational program that exceeds the offerings in advantaged
districts:
It is clear to us that in order to achieve the constitutional standard for the student from these poorer urban
districts -- the ability to function in that society entered
by their relatively advantaged peers -- the totality of
the districts' educational offering must contain elements over and above those found in the affluent suburban district. If the educational fare of the seriously
disadvantaged student is the same as the "regular
education" given to the advantaged student, those
serious disadvantages will not be addressed, and students in the poorer urban districts will simply not be
able to compete. 49

45

Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 372.

46

Id. (citation omitted).

47

Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295.
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 372.

48

49

Id. at 402-03.
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But this equalization of the opportunity to compete only applies
to those who do not receive the constitutional minimum.' °
Relying on a New Jersey Department of Education classification
scheme that places districts into socioeconomic groupings, the
court applied its ruling only to the twenty-eight districts in
District Factor Groups (DFG) A and B, the districts with the
lowest socioeconomic score,5 and stated that "these poorer
urban districts in DFGs A and B become the sole object of the
remedy we impose."52
The resulting decision simultaneously rejects a strict equalization of funds as the constitutional goal and then requires an
equalization of funds for the remedy: "We find that in order to
provide a thorough and efficient education in these poorer urban
districts, the State must assure that their educational expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to those of the more
affluent suburban districts, and that, in addition, their special
disadvantages must be addressed."53 The court thus provided
a ruling that is at best circular, and at worst contradictory and
self-defeating. Restated, the ruling found that equality is not
required constitutionally, but a minimal education is required.
For those not receiving the minimal education, however, equality is required constitutionally. Thus, the equalization only
takes place between the top and bottom rungs of the educational
ladder. Furthermore, this equalization is not merely a straightforward equalization of funds; it is both an expenditure equalization and a more nebulous equalization of the opportunity to
compete within society at large. The equalization of opportunity
is far broader than expenditure equalization, and requires, as
the court indicated, a greater attention to the special needs of
particular districts.54
Rather than trying to make educational opportunities more
alike, the court narrowed its task: it strove to make the educational opportunity of the worst-off equivalent to that of the best-

50

1d. at 387.
" The New Jersey Department of Education classifies all school districts
in the state according to socioeconomic status. The classifications for the over
700 school districts in the state can be found in the annual BUREAU OF GOV'T
RESEARCH AND DEP'T OF GOV'T SERVICES, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE DISTRicT
DATA BOOK (1991).
12

Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 387.

0Id. at 408.
64 Id.
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off. In doing so, the court caught itself in a contradiction: it
rejected the measure of financing disparities as a standard by
which to judge the constitutionality of New Jersey's educational
system, while it determined that the elimination of financing
disparities among certain groups rendered constitutional New
Jersey's educational system. As a result, the attempt to narrow
the focus of the policy problem makes the rationale nearly
incoherent.
C. INNOVATIVE SOCIAL POLICY: EQUITY PRINCIPLES

Although Abbott II may make little sense from a jurisprudential point of view, it makes good sense from an innovative
social policy perspective. In order to see the New Jersey Supreme Court's policy innovation in Abbott 1I, one must explore
some theories about school finance equality. Berne and Stiefel
cite three kinds of equality as relevant to discussions of school
finance equity: horizontal equality, equality of opportunity, and
vertical equality.55 Horizontal equality - the allotment of the
same resources to all students - traditionally has received the
bulk of courts' attention.56 Equality of opportunity exists when
school expenditures are not highly correlated with either property values or the racial composition of a school district.57 -Thus,
equality of opportunity exists when statistical measures of
correlation show no relationship between expenditures and
property wealth or race.5"
Vertical equality is best illustrated by its most commonly
accepted application in the field of special education.59 Advocates of vertical equality argue that additional resources are
necessary if one is to give a handicapped child an education
equivalent to the one provided to an able-bodied child.60 Pro-

55ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN
SCHOOL FINANCE 12-17 (1984).

" See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
67 BERNE & STIEFEL,

supra note 55, at 17.

58 Id.

See id. at 14 (Table 2.1) (noting areas of relative consensus and disagreement among specialists concerning vertical equity).
60 In New Jersey's case, this takes a statutory form in the Quality Edu59

cation Act of 1990 § 14, where a number of physical, mental, developmental
and educational disabilities are assigned weights, called "additional cost
factors," thereby increasing the state aid for each pupil with these disabilities.
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viding a disabled child with the same bundle of resources as one
would provide a child without that disability would ignore the
special needs of the former; additional resources are required to
make the educational experiences of the two children equivalent. Typically, this assessment of the special needs of a student occurs on an individual basis, through screenings for
learning disabilities or enrollments in special education programs. The state then provides additional funds to school
districts through "additional cost factors" that pay for the
supplemental costs of the special education required for the
child.61
But in the Abbott II decision, the court designated entire
school districts as "disabled. '62 This combination of individualized assessment of student needs with a geographical designation of special needs constitutes a novel application of vertical
equality. The notion that particular geographical regions of the
state (school districts) require additional funds (on top of existing special education cost factors) in order to compensate for the
educational difficulties faced by individual students redefines
the scope of vertical equity. Freed from the physical and intellectual characteristics of individual students, a geographicallybased vertical equity has the potential to become far more
politicized. Because few would oppose grants to disabled (i.e.
handicapped or learning impaired) students, individualized
vertical equity rarely receives criticism from those who do not
receive it.
In contrast, a geographically-based vertical equity taps into
the place-driven political divisions of contemporary American
politics. Generally, benefits that accrue to places, independent
of individual need, are subject to political opposition based on
geography, class, or race in a way that individualized benefits
accrued on the basis of universal eligibility are not. Placedriven benefits, rather than individualized benefits, echo and
reinforce existing political divisions. The New Jersey Supreme
Court may have sought to narrow the scope of the beneficiaries
in order to make its program of equalization more feasible, but
its reliance on geographical vertical equality in order to achieve
this enhances, rather than reduces, the prospect for political
conflict.

61

BERNE & STIEFEL, supra note 55, at 14.

' See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 387 (N.J. 1990).
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The school finance reform jurisprudence of the New Jersey
Supreme Court has a long history. The court's stance in the
Abbott II decision is clearly constrained by previous jurisprudential commitments, most notably the court's reliance on the
"thorough and efficient" clause. As a result, the court is caught
in a number of inconsistent positions as it strives to maximize
the political feasibility ofjudicially-imposed social change within
the existing jurisprudential framework. But more significant
than the jurisprudential inconsistencies, which most likely are
noticed only by judicial scholars, is the creation of judicial social
policy that exacerbates existing social and political conflict in its
efforts to defuse it. The application of vertical equity principles
to entire school districts, as opposed to individual students who
meet eligibility requirements, exemplifies that kind of judicial
social policy.
D. DEPOLITICIZING SCHOOL FINANCE: ABBOTT III
In July 1994 the New Jersey Supreme Court reinforced and
made explicit this line of reasoning in its most recent decision in
the Abbott lineage, Abbott II1.63 In Abbott III, the court reaffirmed a central concept from Abbott II, stating:
Those students in the special needs districts, given
their educational disadvantages and the circumstances
of their environment, will not be able to function effectively as citizens in that society, will not be able to
fairly compete as workers. They are entitled at least to
the chance of doing so, and without an equal educational opportunity, they will not have that chance.'
The court acceptedAbbott I's premise that entire districts could
be designated in effect as disabled and require additional
resources to make their students competitive with students in
affluent districts.
However, the Abbott III holding departs from Abbott II in
an important way. In Abbott III, the New Jersey Supreme
Court implied that school financing parity issues should remain
independent of executive and legislative discretion. The court,
in short, sought to depoliticize the issue of school finance. This

Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994).
Id. at 580.
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implication follows from the court's finding that "[b]ecause the
QEA's design for achieving parity depends fundamentally on the
discretionary action of the executive and legislative branches to
increase the special needs weight,... the statute fails to guarantee adequate finding for those districts."65 Ultimately, this
discretionary action is a function of politics, because electoral
pressures and public opinion determine the latitude permitted
of elected leaders in such a hotly contested issue as school
finance.
In a subtle but important shift from Abbott II, the Abbott
III court seemingly wants to insulate the school finance system
from political pressures limiting discretion. To understand the
court's concern about legislative and executive discretion (i.e.,
politics) undermining its holdings, one must examine the policy
response enacted in the wake of Abbott II. Part II below examines how the executive and legislative branches of New Jersey
responded to the Abbott II decision. It includes an evaluation of
the degree to which the court was able to concretely shape the
educational financing system of New Jersey.
H. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
TO ABBOTT I
In 1989, Governor James Florio rode into Drumthwacket,
the New Jersey governor's mansion, with the third largest
margin of victory in a New Jersey gubernatorial race.66 He
quickly put that political capital to work by advancing gun control6" and raising income and sales taxes" in order to erase
the state budget deficit and to fund a school finance equalization program.6 9 Within two years, his approval rating eroded
to twenty-six percent 0 and his Democratic majority within the
6Id.

at 578.

66NEW

JERSEY POLITICS, supra note 22, at 68.

Act of May 30, 1990, ch. 32, 1990 N.J. Laws 217 (gun control bill).
Homestead Property Tax Rebate Act of 1990, ch. 61, §§ 11-20, 1990 N.J.
Laws 671-78 (income tax increase); Act of June 27, 1990, ch. 40, 1990 N.J.
Laws 257 (sales tax increase).
9For an overview of Florio's taxation policies, see NEW JERSEY POLITICS,
supra note 22, at 253-58. For a breakdown of New Jersey's revenue structure
under the Florio plan, see William T. Bogart & Peter M. VanDoren, Do
Legislators Vote Their Constituents' Wallets? (And How Would We Know If

They Did?), 60 S. ECON. J. 357 (1993).
70 Maria Newman, Anger Against Governors Reflected in 3-State Poll, N.Y.
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statehouse was turned out by a veto-proof Republican majority
that vowed to roll back virtually every Democratic legislative
achievement of the previous two years." Clearly, Jim Florio
was not a popular man. What had provoked the ire of New
Jerseyans within those two years?
The fiscal consequences of Florio's aggressive efforts to
equalize school financing and eliminate the state deficit were
enormous. To accomplish both, Florio had to increase taxes by
$2.8 billion just as New Jersey entered a recession. 2 These
fiscal consequences, in turn, had enormous political consequences: disastrous results for Democrats in the 1991 statehouse
elections7 3 and the loss of the governorship in 1993. 74 Thus,
indirectly, the issue of school finance reform, and, more importantly, Florio's handling of the issue, had important consequences for the political control and direction of the Garden State.
But what were the specifics of the QEA that elicited such
outrage? The following list outlines the important elements of
the school finance package passed by the legislature within
three weeks
of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
75
Abbott II:
The existing guaranteed tax base formula was replaced
with a foundation formula, 6 setting the basic foundation

TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al.
71 See Wayne King, New Jersey G.O.P. Vows to Roll Back Millions in
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7 1991, at Al. See also Peter Kerr, The 1990 Elections: New Jersey - A Governor's Response, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8 1990, at Al.
72 See Act of June 27, 1990, ch. 40, 1990 N.J. Laws 257 (sales tax increase).
See also Homestead Property Tax Rebate Act of 1990, ch. 61, §§ 11-20, 1990
N.J. Laws 671-678 (income tax increase).
7' See King, supra note 71.
74 Iver Peterson, In New Jersey, Concern Over Taxes and Trust, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at B7.
7 The following list is adapted from both the Quality Education Act of
1990 and secondary sources, primarily MARGARET E. GOERTZ, THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUALITY EDUCATION AcT OF 1990 (1992);
WILLIAM A. FIRESTONE, ET AL., WHERE THE MONEY WENT: REvENUE, EXPEN-

DITURE, AND PROGRAMMATIC CHANGES IN THE FIRST YEAR OF NEW JERSEY'S
QUALITY EDUCATION ACT (1993); and New York Times articles on the QEA
from March 1990 through October 1990 cited supra notes 70, 71, 74. See also
NEW JERSEY POLITICS, supra note 22, at 273-78.
76 Quality Education Act of 1990, ch. 52, § 4.

19941

NEw JERSEY SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALIZATION

155

aid at $6,835 per pupil. 77 Each district received a proportion of that aid, depending on its wealth (measured
in both
78
property and income) and local tax revenues.
Total state aid to education increased by $1.15 billion. 9

*

Thirty "special needs" districts received an additional
payment of five percent of their foundation aid. These were
almost exclusively poor urban districts."
The minimum foundation aid to approximately 151 so-called
wealthy districts was phased out over four years, by twentyfive percent per year. l Minimum aid to an additional
seventy to eighty districts was reduced over this period.
*

Teacher pension fund payments and social security costs
were shifted back to school districts. 2

*

An important categorical aid program was revamped and
transformed from a "compensatory education" program
(based on the number of students in a district with failing
test scores) into one for "at-risk students (based on the
number of economically disadvantaged students in a dis-

trict)."
"

Each district was required to contribute a local "fair share"
in order to be eligible for state foundation aid.'

The Quality Education Act was billed not only as providing
greater equity in New Jersey's school finance, but also as a tax
break for the middle class.8 Upon legislative approval of the
7 7Id. §
78

7'

6c.

Id.§ 9.
GOERTZ, supranote 75, at 27 (Table 5).

o Quality Education Act of 1990 § 6a.

8

Id.§ 25.
2 Id.§§ 78-79.

8

Id. § 80.
"Id. § 7.
' See Peter Kerr, Florio School-Aid Package Gains FinalApproval, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 22, 1990, at Al.
83
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plan, Governor Florio declared, "Something historically significant is happening here .... This is a day we bring fairness to
the children of New Jersey and the beleaguered and besieged
middle class." 6
A. THE QEA AND GOVERNOR FLoRIo's TAX PLAN
The heart of the appeal to the middle class was a property
tax rebate, passed in conjunction with the QEA."7 Florio and
his advisors thought they could reduce property taxes for the
middle class in two ways: 1) by providing a progressive property tax rebate of up to $500; 8 and 2) by picking up the tab for
local costs of welfare, AFDC, and psychiatric hospitals, thereby
allowing local governments to lower their tax rates.89 By increasing the amount of state aid to a majority of the state's
districts, and by sweetening the pot with a property tax rebate,
Florio and his advisors thought they could secure middle-class
support for school finance equalization."
Unfortunately for the middle class, Florio didn't stop there.
At the same time, he sought to raise income taxes by $1.4
billion to pay for both the QEA and the property tax rebates.9
In addition, he called for an increase and expansion of the sales
tax to erase the state's $1 billion deficit and to create a $275
million surplus to guard against future shortfalls." Thus, the
news of the property tax rebates was lost on an electorate that
saw only a dramatic increase in the income and sales taxes.9 3
Moreover, in the approximately 220 districts in which state aid
would be reduced or eliminated, school officials indicated they
would be forced either to seek increased property taxes or to

8

6 Id. at

B2.
87 See Homestead Property Tax Rebate Act of 1990, ch. 61, §§ 11-20, 1990
N.J. Laws 671-678.
See id. § 3b.
See Peter Kerr, Florio ProposesNew Spending Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 1990, at B2.
90 See NEW JERSEY POLITICS, supra note 22.
9

Homestead Property Tax Rebate Act of 1990 §§ 12-17; see also NEW

JERSEY POLITICS, supra note 22, at 253.

T. Bogart et al., Incidence Effects of a State FiscalPolicy Shift:
The Florio Initiatives in New Jersey, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 371, 372, 375 (1992).
2 William

93See NEW JERSEY POLrrIcs, supra note 22, at 254.
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slash school offerings. 9'4 Thus, for many residents the prospect
of a tax rebate paled in comparison to the prospect of boosted
local property taxes. Statewide, the Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll
indicated that sixty-nine percent thought their property taxes
would go up in the wake of the QEA, precisely the opposite of
what Florio said he wanted.95
B. THE OPPOSITION TO GOVERNOR FLORIO'S PLAN
The QEA and Florio's tax changes did more than pit public
opinion against him. Various elements of the QEA directly
assaulted the interests of organized groups and thereby ensured
that these groups would not only oppose the original passage of
the QEA, but also actively work for its reversal.9 6 The key
elements that turned traditional (or potential) friends into
enemies were: 1) the shift of teachers' pension and social
security payments to districts;9 7 2) local districts' "fair share"
requirement for state aid eligibility;" 3) the elimination of
minimum foundation aid to so-called wealthy districts;9 9 and 4)
to a lesser extent, the reformulation of compensatory education
(based on failing test scores) into an aid program for "at-risk"
students (based on family income of students).' 0 Each of
these components of the QEA helped forge a broad alliance
dedicated to revising the QEA. The New Jersey Education
Association (NJEA), financially-strapped cities, and wealthy
districts each lobbied hard for revisions and, simultaneously,
rode the public outrage that peaked in the late summer and fall

" See Robert Hanley, Florio'sSchool Aid Dream is Town's Nightmare,N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1990, at B2 [hereinafter Florio'sSchool Aid]; Robert Hanley,
New Jersey's Wealthy School Districts Gird for Battle on State Aid, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 1, 1990, at A23 [hereinafter State Aid]. See also Robert Hanley,
School Officials Vent Anger on New Jersey FinancingLaw, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 1990, at B1 [hereinafter School Officials].
5
Star-LedgerlEagletonPoll: New School Funding Gets Low Grades, Poll
SL'EP 29-4 (EP 79-4) (Eagleton Institute of Politics, 1990) [hereinafter StarLedger/Eagleton Poll]; see also Peter Kerr, supra note 85.
96
See GOERTZ, supranote 75, at 13; NEw JERSEY POLITICS, supra note 22,
at 275-76.

s1 Quality Education Act of 1990, ch. 52, §§ 78-79.
98Id.

§ 7.
9 Id. § 25.
1
00 Id. § 80.
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of 1990.101 Combined, these organized interests and the intense public pressure forced Florio to accept revisions to the
QEA that struck both at the original intent of Florio's plan and
at the New Jersey Supreme Court's objectives as articulated in
Abbott I.1 °2 This dual-edged democratic backlash, from pressure groups and mobilized public opinion, reversed major
elements of QEA in the spring of 1991 and placed the legislature and the executive on yet another collision course with the
New Jersey Supreme Court.'0 3 Thus, both the organized opposition of persistent players in New Jersey's perennial school
financing drama and the opinions of New Jersey's residents and
taxpayers provided strong opposition to the QEA.
1. DistrictsPay Pension and Social Security Costs
In political terms, perhaps the most costly of the QEA's
changes was the shift of teachers' pension and social security
payments back to the districts.'
The rationale for the
change was simple: because districts negotiated retirement
packages and wages with teachers, but did not pay either the
pension or social security costs that accompanied those contracts, they had no incentive to keep costs down."0 5 In effect,
they spent the state's money without first obtaining the state's
approval. Moreover, these payments amounted to indirect
subsidies to affluent districts because they generally paid their
teachers more than did poor districts. This resulted in pension
and social security payments by the state contributing to financing inequities rather than to greater equity.0 6

101 See NEW JERSEY POLITIcS, supra note 22, at 274.
102 See

Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).

103 See FIRESTONE, supra note 75, at 5-7.
104

See Peter Kerr, Teachers and Bergen DemocratsAttack Florio Budget

Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1990, at Bl; see also Wayne King, Teachers Flunk
Democrats (And Vice Versa) in Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, § 4 at 5; Jay
Romano, Elderly Worry About School Tax Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1990,
§12 (New Jersey) at 1.
105
See Robert Hanley, Schools in New Jersey Open Amid Uncertainty,N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 6, 1990, at B3; see also Abbott, 575 A.2d at 383-84; Priscilla Van
Tassel, Schools Preparingfor Changes in Financing,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
1990, § 12 (New Jersey), at 1.
"OGOERTZ, supra note 75, at 11 (1992); see also Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 383-
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By attacking these payments, Florio and the legislature incurred the wrath of the NJEA, a group consistently ranked as
the strongest interest group in the state. 10 7 With six full-time
lobbyists, the state's largest PAC fund, 10 8 nineteen field offices
throughout the state, and thirty-seven field representatives, the
NJEA had a capacity to mobilize pressure virtually unmatched
among New Jersey's interest groups."' The NJEA opposed
the pension and social security shift because it meant, in effect,
lower wages if districts could not raise taxes to offset the new
burden."0 Furthermore, the stakes were huge: newspaper
reports at the time indicated the state would save $800 million
with the local assumption of pension and social security obligations."' Florio and his aides were able to muscle the bill past
a legislature heavily lobbied by the NJEA by labelling the
organization a special interest that was holding New Jersey's
children hostage for financial gain." This name-calling stung
the NJEA, which had endorsed Florio enthusiastically in his
1989 gubernatorial bid."' Dolores Corona, NJEA's director of
governmental relations, told a New York Times reporter that
the organization felt betrayed by the Florio administration and
that it had been treated like "an enemy." 4 This loss of a key
ally hurt Florio significantly when the legislature, terrified by
the tax revolt of 1990, turned to the QEA as a source of funds
for tax relief in the winter and spring of 1991."' Moreover,
107 Barbara G. Salmore & Stephen A. Salmore, New Jersey: FromPolitical
Hacks to PoliticalAction Committees, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE
NORTHEASTERN STATES 235, 235-36 (Ronald J. Hrebenar & Clive S. Thomas
eds., 1993).
8
'o NEW JERSEY POLITICS, supra note 22, at 100 (The NJEA PAC ranked
first among perennial PACs in 1985, 1987, and 1991, and contributed $268,000
to New Jersey elections in 1991); Salmore & Salmore, supranote 107, at 247.
o Salmore & Salmore, supra note 107, at 236.

110 See sources cited supra note 104.

...
See Kerr, supra note 104.
"Id.

at B5.

"I Craig J. Shearman, Florio Wins NJEA Endorsement, U.P.I., Aug. 28,
1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file). NJEA President Betty Kraemer stated
at a press conference announcing the endorsement: "Jim Florio is the crystalclear choice of educators.... NJEA is ready to go all out for the man who has
shown he is ready to lead our state into the 1990s." Id.
114 See Kerr, supra note 104.

David Kehler, The Trenton Tea Party: The Story of New Jersey's Tax
Revolt, 60 POLY REV. 46, 48 (Spring 1992); see also Van Tassel, supra note
115
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without the educational establishment behind him, Florio had
difficulty claiming that the enormous changes wrought by the
QEA would improve New Jersey's educational system.
2. State Aid Eligibility: Taxing the Cities
Another group that had reason to oppose particular elements of the QEA was, strangely enough, some of New Jersey's
financially strapped cities." 6 Although the thirty poorest
urban areas were slated to receive approximately forty percent
of the $1.15 billion dollar infusion of state aid, they also were
required to raise their local tax rates in order to qualify for
foundation aid, which constituted the bulk of the state's contribution." 7 Estimates in the fall of 1990 indicated that eight of
the thirty districts would have been required to raise taxes to
qualify for full foundation aid."' Given the vehement anti-tax
sentiment raging throughout New Jersey at that time," 9 tax
increases in these urban areas proved no more popular than in
the suburbs, especially since they virtually were mandated by
the state. 2 ' This dilemma, combined with localities' assumption of pension and social security payments,' 2 ' meant the
QEA was not a godsend for many urban localities. Although
unwilling to criticize directly the QEA because it provided them
with a large infusion of resources, these districts were not
opposed to tinkering with the plan, especially concerning the
pension and social security payments and the local "fair share
requirement."'22 Thus, if districts that gained the most from

105, at 9. Presumably, this lack of support hurt him even more in the 1993
gubernatorial race against Christine Whitman, when the NJEA decided to
endorse neither candidate.
16 See Salmore & Salmore, supra note 107, at 275-76; see also School
Officials, supra note 94.
, School Officials, supra note 94.
118

Id. The eight are Irvington, Milville, Passaic, Union City, Philipsburg,

Garfield, West New York and Vineland. Irvington, according to press reports,
would have to raise $6.1 million in local revenues in order to qualify for a $5.3
million increase in foundation aid. Id.
119 For an overview of the New Jersey tax revolt of 1990-91, see Kehler,
supra note 115, at 46-49.
'2 0 See School Officials, supra note 94.
121 See Kerr, supra note 104.

'

See School Officials, supra note 94.
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the QEA were willing to see it amended, then virtually no one
would be opposed to some modification of the plan. In this
regard, the urban districts' objections to the QEA took the
brakes off the amendment process.
3. Eliminationof Minimum Aid to Wealthy Districts
School administrators in the relatively affluent districts
that were to be weaned from state aid over the next four years
A total of
also were dismayed by the effects of the QEA.'
220 districts would see their foundation aid either reduced or
eliminated over that time period, while 150 districts were
1
scheduled to receive no state foundation aid whatsoever. 2
Thus, in order to balance their budgets, these districts would
have been required either to cut existing programs or to raise
local taxes.' Neither option was desirable.
On October 31, 1990, at the opening of the annual conventions of the New Jersey School Board Association and the New
Jersey Association of School Administrators, hostile superintendents verbally attacked state Education Commissioner John

1

See State Aid, supra note 94, at B3; see also Robert Hanley, Foes of

Florio's School Plan Are Hopeful About Changes, N.Y. TIMES, November 10,
1990, at A26.
' See Robert Hanley, Florio School-Aid Plan: Cutting 2 Ways at Once,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 22, 1990, at B2.
Florio'sSchool Aid, supra note 94.
Some school districts explored a third option of privately funding public
schools:
[Tihe Board of Education is now exploring various avenues of
alternatefunding... For example, the P.T.A. will be asked to lend
its fund-raising expertise to help the school begin an endowment
fund ....
One avenue of funding'that has been quite successful in many
New Jersey school districts is an education foundation. An education foundation exists as a non-profit, non-political entity independent of the Board of Education. Its mission involves the development of supportive community and private sector relationships with
a school or school system....
Perhaps an education foundation, which providesprivate support
for public education is an idea whose time has come for the Essex
Fells School.
Letter from William S. Palmer, Superintendent, Essex Fells School District, to
residents of Essex Fells (Jan. 1994) (on file with author); see also William
Cells, III, Schools Go Outside Districts for Money, N.Y. TIMEs, October 16,
1991, at B9.
'
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Ellis and Florio's top education advisor, Thomas Corcoran, the

chief architect of the QEA. 12' As the New York Times wrote,
"Today's conference became a forum for confronting Dr. Ellis
and Mr. Corcoran. ' 1 27 When Ellis asked the approximately
400 people in the room for a show of support,
detractors outvot2
ed supporters by a ratio of nine to one. 1
4. CompensatingPoverty Versus Low Scores
The next day, chief administrative officers from twenty-five
wealthy suburban school districts met with Ellis for two hours
to persuade him to change the QEA. 1 29 The administrators
raised the topic of compensatory educational aid, because at-risk
aid would now be allocated on the basis of a student's poverty
rather than on test scores. This meant that affluent districts
stood to lose a tremendous amount of aid, 3 ' because within
affluent districts, the percentage of students who perform poorly
on achievement tests exceeds the percentage of students from
poor families. Indeed, this change irritated some superintendents more than did the elimination of minimum aid. The New
Jersey Supreme Court explicitly ruled minimum aid unconstitutional in Abbott 1, 31 but critics saw Florio's revamping of
compensatory education to direct more aid to poor (and typically2
urban) districts as moving beyond the court's mandate.1
Under the old compensatory education plan, the thirty poorest
districts enrolled approximately fifty-three percent of the students eligible statewide for compensatory aid. 3 3 Correspondingly, they received approximately fifty-three percent of total
compensatory aid. Under the new plan (according to projections
in the fall of 1990), these thirty districts would enroll approximately sixty-nine percent of the students eligible for at-risk aid

'2 The conference was held October 31 to November 2, 1990, in Atlantic
City, New Jersey. See School Officials, supra note 94.
127 11d.
128

Id.

1

Hanley, supra note 123.
0 See generally Robert Hanley, New Jersey Shifts Plan for At Risk'

Students, N.Y. TIMES, October 6, 1990, at A27.
"s1Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 383 (N.J. 1990).
132Hanley, supra note 130.

133Id.
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and would receive
approximately seventy percent of the total at13 4

risk funding.

After the loss of minimum aid, affluent districts were
angered particularly by the additional loss of compensatory aid
and viewed the shift as poor educational policy. 13 The bifurcation of compensatory aid and academic performance struck
many suburban administrators as damaging not only to their
districts' financial interests, but also to their academic interests.
As they stated in a position paper developed after the passage
of the QEA, "the Quality Education Act goes beyond the mandate of the court... and includes provisions which will fundamentally weaken the most successful and highest-achieving
public school districts in the state. ... Weak schools should not

be made strong by making strong schools weak." 3 '
C. IMPLEMENTING ABBOTT II

The policies objected to by these interest groups were not
necessarily the products of the Florio administration alone.
Many of the complaints laid directly upon Florio's doorstep were
in fact disagreements with the content of the Abbott II decision.
In its programmatic response to Abbott II, the Florio administration, which went beyond the decision in some respects,
largely accepted the validity of the court's demands. Thus, the
political abuse suffered by the Florio administration stemmed in
large part not from its own proposals but from the policy implications of the Abbott II decision. For example, the Florio plan
to phase out minimum aid emerged directly from the court's
ruling that minimum aid is unconstitutional. 13 7 Further, the

'MId. A study of five of the 30 special needs districts conducted during the
1991-92 academic year found an average of 67% of students eligible for at-risk
aid. GARY NATRIELLO & MORGAN COLLINS, NECESSARY BUT NOT SuFFIcIENT:

THE QuALITY EDUCATION ACT AND AT-RISK STUDENTS 27 (1993).
' "There's not a one-to-one correlation between kids who have academic
problems and kids who can't afford lunch," Robert S. Kish, Superintendent of
Livingston School District, told a New York Times reporter. Alan Sugarman,
Superintendent of Fort Lee schools, put it more strongly: "Ithink the concept
is ridiculous.... For somebody to come to the conclusion a student is at risk
because he qualifies for free lunch is crazy."' Hanley, supra note 130.
136 GOERTZ, supra note 75, at 13 (quoting Position Paper on Quality
Education Act of 1990 by Chief School Administrators of 25 Suburban Dis-

tricts (Oct. 24, 1990)).
137 Compare Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 383 (N.J. 1990) with Quality
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court insisted that the funding of inner-city school districts be
"substantially equal" to that of affluent suburbs and that the
funding level not rest upon the taxation and budgetary decisions
of local school boards.'3 8 This, too, contributed to the QEA's
overall aim to pump additional aid into New Jersey's cities
through both the at-risk aid program 3 9 and the substantial
infusion of foundation aid. 4°
The Florio administration did go beyond the court's ruling
regarding the issue of shifting teachers' Social Security and
On this matter,
pension payments back to local districts."
the Abbott 11 court respected a prior decision upholding the
state's assumption of these payments on administrative
grounds. However, it explicitly stated that the payments may
be "constitutionally infirm" and left its jurisprudential options
open for a future ruling.13 The Florio administration seized
upon this ambiguity and included the local assumption within
the QEA, only to open a political hornet's nest. Because Florio
aggressively undertook these reforms rather than wait for the
court to mandate them, his administration bore the brunt of the
political outrage over these changes.'"
In sum, many of the problems with the QEA cited by organized interests were not wholly of Florio's making. His administration, although perhaps overeager and lacking political foresight, formulated a response to Abbott II that specifically and
meaningfully addressed the constitutional violations found by
the court. The political costs of doing so, clearly, were exceptionally high. However, to assert that the goal and aim of the
reforms were Florio's alone is to understate the policy implications of the court's actions.
Whether the QEA was a result of judicial or executive
policy-making, the opposition among organized interest groups
was intense. The three groups described above - two wings of
the educational establishment and one group ostensibly best

Education Act of 1990, § 25.
138Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 385.
139 Quality Education Act of 1990, ch. 52, § 80.
140 Id.

§ 6c.

141

Id. §§ 78-9.

142

Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 289-291 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson 1).

143 Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 384 (N.J. 1990).
144

See supra part II.B.
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positioned to benefit from the QEA - were instrumental to the
movement to amend the QEA. Confronted with mounting
public pressure in the form of a tax revolt,' legislators saw
that few parties would actively defend the QEA. Moreover,
Democratic legislators saw that they would suffer at the hands
of voters if they did not repair their image as proponents of
heavy and destructive taxation.'46 The expert and informed
opinion that the QEA needed amending, as represented by these
three groups, provided legislators with the legitimate cloak they
needed to rework the QEA dramatically.
Ultimately, however, neither the urban leaders nor the
NJEA were at all happy with the revisions that the legislature
enacted.'47 However, their support for the process of modification was necessary in order for the outrage felt by voters to
result in substantial changes to the QEA.'4 8 The fact that the
NJEA and New Jersey's cities could not control the outcome of
that revision process shows the strength and breadth of the tax
revolt in New Jersey. Their urging was necessary to initiate the
amendment process, but it was not nearly sufficient to control
it. Instead, public opinion as registered by legislators in the
General Assembly had much to do with the ultimate shape of
the revised QEA.
III. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
QUALITY EDUCATION ACT OF 1990
The citizens of New Jersey in 1990 were of two minds concerning the equity of school financing. While a state-wide poll
taken in July 1990 indicated that a majority of respondents endorsed greater equity, many of these respondents simultaneously opposed the specific policies designed to achieve that equity.49 This section analyzes in detail the dimensions of New
Kehler, supra note 115, at 46-49.
Michael Mintrom, Why Efforts to Equalize School FundingHave Failed:
Towards a Positive Theory, 46 POL. RES. Q. 847 (1993).
" See King, supra note 104. Betty Kraemer, President of the NJEA,
stated: "Democrats turned their backs on educators, our schools and our
students when they slashed $360 million from the original Quality Education
Act." Id.
'48See, e.g., NEW JERSEY PoLiTIcs, supra note 22; Salmore & Salmore,
supra note 107.
49
Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll, supra note 95. The Eagleton Institute has
been gracious enough to provide me with the raw data of their poll. It is their
145
146
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Jersey public opinion about the Quality Education Act through
a logit analysis of dichotomous approval/disapproval responses
to the Abbott II decision and to the QEA itself. 5 This analysis ascertains the determinants of respondents' attitudes towards the QEA and integrates these survey findings within the
broader patterns of New Jersey school finance politics in 199091.
The analysis herein tests three theories of opposition to the
QEA and controls for the influence that the presence of schoolage children has on respondents' answers. The findings indicate
that Whites and non-Whites in New Jersey perceived school
financing differently if they had school-age children. But among
people without children, race did not shape the perception of
school financing; instead, economic costs were more salient to
the support (or lack thereof) of school finance reform.
In early July 1990 the Eagleton Institute queried 800
residents of New Jersey about their support for the school
financing plan enacted by the New Jersey legislature a few
weeks earlier.'' Ai described above, the Quality Education
Act of 1990 emerged in response to the court's decision that
New Jersey's existing system of funding public schools was
unconstitutional, and also in response to Governor James
Florio's aggressive legislative campaign to restructure educational financing in New Jersey and to alter dramatically the tax
structure designed to pay for it.
On a descriptive level, in 1990 significant support for
greater equity in school financing existed alongside an equally
significant lack of support for the QEA. The Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll, taken between July 2 and 10, 1990, showed
that of those with knowledge of Abbott II, fifty-four percent
agreed with the decision (either mildly or strongly) while thirtyeight percent disagreed (again, either mildly or strongly). The
remaining eight percent were undecided in their opinion. In
contrast, only thirty-five percent of those surveyed approved of

data that I analyze in this section. I am especially grateful to Mr. Rob Krebs
of the Eagleton Institute for his technical assistance in procuring the data.
150See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT AND PROBIT MODELS (Michael S. Lewis-Beck ed. 1984) (providing
a brief account of logistic regression techniques); GARY KING, UNIFYING
POLITICAL METHODOLOGY: THE LIKELIHOOD THEORY OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 107-08 (1989) (explaining how to present logistic regressions in tabular
form, using the "first differences" technique).
15

Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll, supra note 95.
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the recently passed QEA, while fifty-six
percent disapproved,
1 52
and nine percent were undecided.
What accounts for the variation in this support for the
QEA? A logistic regression technique on the original Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll data set can be used to estimate the influence
of a number of independent variables on the inclination of a
respondent to favor or disfavor either the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision or the legislative response to it. The data set
itself contains 157 variables encompassing not only the usual
socio-economic demographics but also responses to questions
about the perceived impact of new taxes, the perceived effects of
school finance reform on local districts, whether the respondent
has school-age children, and so on. These demographic characteristics, as well as opinions gathered by the Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll about other governmental policies, led to the
development of distinct models that tested possible explanations
about the origins of support for school finance reform in New
Jersey as it was enacted in 1990.
A. MODELS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS SCHOOL
FINANCING
This article develops three possible explanations for respondent opposition to either the Abbott If decision or the QEA. The
first is economic self-interest. Under this theory, opposition to
the Abbott If decision emerged from the perceived costs or
benefits that court-ordered school finance equalization could
bring. These costs and benefits could come in the form of
increased taxes, lower state aid to a district, or possibly increased state funding to a district. Opposition to or support for
the QEA was even less hypothetical; under the QEA's redistribution plan, the winners and losers were quite clear: Individuals living in affluent suburbs were slated to receive the shorter
end of two sticks; their school districts would receive less state
aid,'5 3 and they would have to pay more in state income taxes,
sales taxes,'" and possibly increased local taxes as well.'5 5
Because of the zero-sum nature of school finance equalization,
152Id.

Quality Education Act of 1990, ch. 52, § 25.
Homestead Property Tax Rebate Act of 1990 (income tax increase), and
Act of June 27, 1990, ch. 40, §§ 1-11, 1990 N.J. Laws 200 (sales tax increase).
I" See supra note 94.
14

168 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:137
economic self-interest would dictate that the losers opposed the
QEA and the winners supported it. The problem with this
argument, however, is that in early July 1990 there were no
firm predictions of how much the winners would win and the
losers would lose. The only source of any such predictions came
from newspaper and television accounts that drew more from
political rhetoric than from firm school finance calculations. As
a result, the perception of how much aid an individual's town or
city might lose or gain played a large role in public support of
and hostility to the QEA.' 56
A second model that might explain opposition to the court
decision or the QEA is an ideological one. Similar to, but
nonetheless distinct from an economic self-interest model, an
anti-tax sentiment model could account for much of the support
for or opposition to the QEA or Abbott II, independent of whether one's district gained or lost aid or whether one's tax bill went
up or down. This would be particularly true if the sentiment
were conjoint with an overall conservative ideological bent.
Anti-tax sentiment was a huge force in New Jersey politics from
the Summer of 1990 through the legislative elections of November 1991, 7 when the Republicans swept out the Democratic
15
majority.
The third model is a racial geography model that examined
the effect of race and geographic location on one's likelihood to
support or to oppose the court decision and the QEA. The
theory behind this model is that anti-urban sentiment in the
suburbs and rural areas combined with the perception that nonWhites were the sole beneficiaries of school finance equalization
to yield a White/non-White and urban/suburban-rural split over
the issue of school finance equalization. In some ways, this is a
test of the racial politics of entitlements described by Edsall and
Edsall,'5 8 but on a local rather than national level.'5 9 In
156 Robert Hanley, New School Aid in "917 Toms River Isn't Cheering,N.Y.

TIMEs, Sept. 17, 1990, at B4 (noting that the Toms River community, largely
unaware that their school districts were marked to receive millions of dollars
of aid, bitterly resented Governor Jim Florio's $1.3 billion tax increase of
1990).
5 See Wayne King, Florio Faces GrowingAnti-Tax Storm in New Jersey,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 23, 1990, at B1 (describing the growing "tax revolt" that
threatened Florio's popularity after he helped pass the biggest tax increase in
New Jersey history); King, supra note 71 (noting the Republican's pledge to
"roll back about $550 million" of Florio's $2.8 billion tax package after they
won a majority in both houses of the Legislature).
1 58
, THoMAs B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT
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sum, this analysis tests these three alternative models - economic self-interest, ideology and anti-tax sentiment,
and race and geographic location - to explain why respondents
supported or opposed Abbott 11 and the QEA.
B. THE DATA
The data are in an SPSS portable file that was analyzed
using SPSS/PC+. The file contains 800 observations and 157
variables. The Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll weighted all observations to improve sample selection (ensuring that age and education frequencies corresponded to U.S. Census data for New
Jersey 60 ) by using an iterative raking algorithm. The two
responses used as dependent variables - an approval/disapproval question concerning Abbott 11 and an approval/disapproval question concerning the QEA - were collapsed.
A number of independent dummy variables were also collapsed
into dichotomous approval/disapproval responses or into polytomous responses, as detailed below.
C. OPERATIONALIZING THE MODELS

1. The Economic Self-Interest Model
The poll contains a number of questions directly related to
the perceived economic impact of the school finance reform
package and of the income and sales taxes levied in part to pay
for it. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they
thought the tax package would hurt, have no effect, or help
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN PoLIcs 230-31(1991) (explaining
how "the rise of Republican suburbs in a 'White noose' around declining cities
with majority, or near-majority, Black and Hispanic populations is becoming
the central characteristic of politics in such key states as New York, Michigan,
Illinois, and Ohio").
"-9I should note, however, that I am not examining the racial affect of
respondents but their racial identity, and then estimating the likelihood that
they will oppose school finance equalization. The difference is important
because if one is to argue that racial prejudice drives this opposition then one
needs a further measure of racial affect or other evidence of racial hostility.
Evidence of a racial split on this issue is not tantamount to evidence of racial
prejudice. The former is a form of racial politics; the latter is a form of racism.
Although both are lamentable and destructive, the two are different.
1' Telephone Interview with Rob Krebs, Eagleton Institute of Politics,
Rutgers University (Dec. 14, 1993).
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"people like you" (Variable EFFECT); whether they thought
property taxes would go up, stay the same, or go down (Variable
PROPTAX), and whether they thought their local school district
would lose or get aid (Variable GETAID). Further, they were
asked to identify their income level from four categories (Vari-

able INCOME2). I then recoded EFFECT into a dichotomous
(hurt vs. help/no difference) variable (Variable EFFECTR).
Together, these four variables (EFFECT_R, PROPTAX, GETAID, INCOME2) comprise the economic self-interest model.
2. The Anti-Tax and Ideology Model
The poll also contains data on whether respondents would
accept an increase and expansion of the sales tax (Variable
SALESTAX), whether they would accept an increase and expansion of the state income tax (Variable INCTAX), and a ideological self-identification score, using the terms conservative,
moderate, and liberal (Variable IDEOLOG)."6 ' These three
variables (SALESTAX, INCTAX, IDEOLOG) comprise the antitax and ideological model.
3. The Racial Geography Model
Using a racial self-identification variable, I collapsed all
non-Caucasian values into a "non-White" value, which yielded a
dichotomous White/non-White variable (Variable RACE). For
the geographic residence of the respondent, I employed the poll's
classification of municipalities into four varieties: center city,
city and old suburb, new suburb, and rural, and thereby yielded
a polytomous variable (Variable TYPE). These two variables
(RACE, TYPE) comprise the racial geography model.
D. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD ABBOTT H
1. All Respondents
There was a significant measure of support for the Abbott I
decision among respondents to the Star-Ledger/Eagleton
Poll.'6 2 Fully fifty-four percent of those polled said they ap-

161 Star-Ledger/EagletonPoll, supra note

162 Id.

95.
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proved of the decision; thirty-eight percent disapproved.
Through the use of a logistic regression technique, this section
explores in close detail some of the possible explanations for the
variation of support for Abbott II.16 Figure One 1 65 shows
the findings of that logistic regression among all respondents.
Four of the variables meet the conventional threshold significance of 0.05: perceived effect of tax package (EFFECT), perceived loss or gain of school aid in local district (GETAID),
acceptance of an increase and expansion of an income tax
(INCTAX), and ideology (IDEOLOG). Both ttie economic selfinterest model (represented by EFFECT and GETAID) and the
anti-tax/ideology model (INCTAX and IDEOLOG), apparently
exerted a 66strong negative influence on support for the Abbott I
1
decision.
To discern the magnitude of these relationships one must
look at the right side of Figure One. A logistic regression
requires a further interpretative step because the parameter
estimate B is not equivalent to a regression coefficient. It
represents, instead, the change in the log of the odds ratio of
approving or disapproving the Abbott I decision, given a perunit increase of each particular independent variable. From
this measure, however, we can calculate the probability that an
individual would approve or disapprove of the Abbott II decision
or the QEA, holding the values of the other independent variables constant at their means. This calculation for each variable is7 shown in the "Change in Probability" column of Figure
16
One.
Figure One shows that an anticipated loss of school aid to
one's district led to a sixteen point drop in the likelihood that a
respondent approved ofAbbott II with all other values held constant at their means. Similarly, the difference between viewing
oneself as a liberal or as a conservative (1=liberal, 2= moderate,

16 Id.
'6 See generally ALDRICH & NELSON, supra note 150 (providing a brief
discussion of logistic regression techniques).
165
See app. infra at 190.
'6 The dependent variable was coded "1" for approval and "2" for disapproval; a positive parameter estimate, then, means a greater propensity to
disapprove of Abbott IL
167 This table and its calculations follow the "first differences" formulas

recommended in KING, supra note 150, at 107-08.
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3=conservative) translated into a seventeen point drop in the
likelihood of approval for Abbott H.
Changes indicated in the "Change in X" column in the four
significant variables (EFFECT, GETAID, INCTAX, and
IDEOLOG) generated for each independent variable a sixteen to
nineteen point drop in the probability that a respondent approved of Abbott II with all other independent variables held
constant at their means. Thus, economic self-interest and antitax/ideological sentiment appear to have underlain the opposition to the Abbott II decision, at least among the population at
large.
2. Parents of ChildrenEnrolled in Public Schools
Turning now to an analysis of parental attitudes towards
the Abbott H decision, Figure Two 6 ' shows the findings for a
logistic regression among parents of children enrolled in public
schools. The important difference between Figures Two and
One lies in the diminished significance of the anti-tax/ideological
model. Neither ideology nor attitudes towards the income tax
meet the conventional 0.05 threshold. In contrast, the only
significant variable is the perceived loss or gain of state aid to
one's local district. Not only is this variable the only significant
one (at 0.005), it also results in a forty-two point drop in the
likelihood that a respondent supported Abbott II, the largest
decrease (or increase) in the regression. Clearly, parents of
public school children reacted to the direct or indirect gain or
benefit Abbott H produced for their district. Remarkably, this
finding is controlled for race, municipality, ideology and income.
But as discussed below, it contrasts sharply with parental
1 69
attitudes toward the Quality Education Act.
Based on this analysis, one can conclude that those who expected to pay for the equalization either in the form of increased
taxes or reduced state aid to their local district were, quite
understandably, less likely to support the Abbott 11 decision
than those who expected to benefit from it. In addition, ideological sentiments and attitudes towards the income tax also
significantly influenced attitudes towards Abbott II. Among
parents of children enrolled in public schools, political ideology
and anti-tax sentiment did not predict with reliability
168 See app. infra at 191.

169See infra part IV.E.2.
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respondents' attitudes towards the Abbott 11 decision. Instead,
parents were much more responsive to their perception of
whether their district would lose or gain state aid. Race does
not appear to predict with reliability the support for the Abbott
11 decision either among parents or the population at large,
after controlling for perceived effects of the equalization effort.
This last finding, however, lies in dramatic contrast to the
reliability of race as a predictor of attitudes among parents
towards the Quality Education Act of 1990.
E. ATTITUDES TowARD THE QUALITY EDUCATION ACT OF 1990

1. Attitudes of All Respondents
In contrast to fairly strong support for the Abbott H decision, public opinion weighed heavily against the Quality Education Act of 1990, as indicated above. Respondents may have
supported the ideal of equality the court expressed but opposed
the concrete policy designed to implement that sentiment. In
order to understand the dimensions of this opposition, one must
examine the findings of the logistic regression run on the
approval/disapproval responses to the Quality Education Act.
Figure Three1 "0 shows the findings of this analysis for all
models described above for all respondents. Figure Three
reveals that economic self-interest heavily influenced attitudes
towards the QEA. Only two independent variables - perceived
loss/gain of aid to one's district and the perceived effect of the
QEA on one's local property tax rates - are statistically significant above the 0.05 threshold; anti-tax sentiment and ideology
do not appear to be significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the
effect of these two significant variables is rather large: a
perception that one's property taxes will rise results in a twenty-five point drop in the probability that a respondent supported
the QEA. Similarly, a perception that the local school district
would receive reduced state aid lowers respondents' likelihood of
approval by fifteen points. Thus, one could say with reasonable
assurance that among all respondents, economic self-interest
most heavily influenced the attitudes towards the QEA.

170 See app. infra at 192.
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2. Attitudes of Parents of Public School Children
Did parents of school-age children make the same kind of
rational economic calculations when they evaluated the desirability of the QEA? As evidenced by the analysis of attitudes
towards the Abbott II decision, parents employed different
rationales in evaluating the desirability of school finance reforms than did the population at large. An analysis of parental
attitudes toward the QEA shows a similar shift. The data
shown in Figure Four' 7 ' indicates that race and the
respondent's type of municipality are far more reliable predictors of QEA support than economic self-interest. Among parents of children enrolled in public schools, the race and the
municipality of the respondent are the only statistically significant variables, even when controlled for income, perceived
impact on state aid, ideology, and the perceived effect on property taxes, among other factors. The result is that a White parent
of a child enrolled in public schools was thirty-four points less "
likely to approve of the QEA than a non-White when all other
independent values are held constant at their means.
Interestingly, however, the municipality of a respondent
runs counter to the hypothesized trend. A twenty-one percentage point probability difference exists between respondents who
live in the inner city versus those living in the suburbs when all
other values are held constant at their means. But the direction
is positive, leading to the conclusion that suburbanites favor the
school aid redistribution program more than inner-city residents.
However, one must examine these patterns more carefully
to understand fully the relationship. Figure Five'7 2 represents
a cross-tabulation of the approval and disapproval rates across
municipality types for White parents of children enrolled in
public schools, while Figure Six 173 shows the same for nonWhite parents. Whites almost uniformly opposed the QEA at
weighted rates ranging from 94.8% in the inner city to approximately seventy-one percent in new suburbs. Non-Whites, in
contrast, show a more varied response. Non-Whites in the inner
city favored the QEA by weighted rates of approximately sixtyfive percent to thirty-five percent. Non-Whites in the older
171 See

app. infra at 193.

17 See app. infra at 194.-

...See app. infra at 195.
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suburbs opposed the QEA by rates similar to Whites - seventyeight percent opposed to twenty-two percent supporting. But
non-Whites in the newer suburbs favored the QEA at rates
higher than any non-White group, by approximately sixty-eight
percent opposed to thirty-two percent in favor. The consistency
of White opposition and the variability of non-White support
across municipality types shows a non-linear relationship
between municipality type and support for the QEA. Thus,
interpreting the logistic regression equation alone results in the
somewhat erroneous conclusion that living in the newer suburbs
led to greater support for the QEA. Perhaps a better way to
explain the relationship is to say that Whites in the newer
suburbs were less opposed to the QEA than Whites in the inner

city.
Two elements of this analysis, the White parents' intense
opposition to the QEA in the inner city and the non-White
parents' opposition in the older suburbs, merit further discussion. White people whose children attend public schools and
who live in the inner city opposed the QEA by a ratio of approximately nine to one. This finding is remarkable because the
QEA was designed to improve inner-city education. At least
three possible explanations exist for this counterintuitive finding. First, Whites may feel disenfranchised in cities with large
minority populations and believe that additional funds will aid
minority children rather than White children. Second, Whites
may feel that the money would be wasted in the inner-city
schools, despite the fact that their children would receive at
least some benefit. Third, Whites in the inner city may oppose
the program for non-economic reasons such as racism, not
realizing that benefits would accrue to them as well as to
minorities. Whatever the explanation, the pronounced racial
division within a group most likely to benefit directly from the
QEA - inner-city parents of children enrolled in public
schools - combined with the economic irrationality of White
inner-city opposition, leads to the conclusion that race was an
implicit factor in this group's opposition to the QEA.
A second finding, the opposition to the QEA from non-White
parents of children enrolled in public schools in older suburbs,
requires further explanation. Here, Whites and non-Whites
expressed similar opposition to the QEA, but non-Whites in both
newer suburbs and inner cities largely endorsed the plan. Why
did non-Whites in older suburbs view the matter differently?
One possible explanation may be that non-Whites moved to
these older suburbs - most likely from the central cit-
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ies - because the educational opportunities were greater for
their children there. They may feel, as a result, that the innercity schools are not worth the money, having had direct experience with them. Whatever the reason, this finding indicates
that racial divisions are not uniform; rather, they bifurcate the
suburb from the inner city, and rich from poor. Race thus
works multivalently in New Jersey educational politics, at times
salient, at times irrelevant.
This quantitative analysis of public opinion about the
Abbott 11 decision and the Quality Education Act of 1990 is
illuminating for a number of reasons. First, it reveals that for
the population at large, race had little to do with either support
for Abbott I or for the QEA. Instead, pocketbook considerations
of effect on individual taxes and on aid to one's local district
largely determined attitudes of the general population. In
contrast, the attitudes of parents of children enrolled in public
schools toward Abbott II were influenced less by tax issues than
by issues of local aid. In addition, race is the strongest determinant of this group's support for or opposition to the QEA. But
the racial cleavage is somewhat fluid, because it intersects with
geography and class in ways that sometimes align minorities
and Whites but usually divide them.
A question immediately arises, however, from this analysis.
Why were parents of children enrolled in public schools more
racially divided on this issue than the public at large? Clearly,
racial segregation and public education have long been contentious issues, and scholars have noted that self-interest is not
always the driving force behind issues that link education and
race.'7 4 From this perspective, the politics of school finance
equalization may be more symbolic than economic." 5 The
issue conjoins race and class in a volatile mix, provoking in
some people an economically irrational but possibly symbolically
important opposition. The data above show that school finance
equalization in New Jersey means different things to different
people, and at least one of those meanings equates race with

'1'See generally David 0. Sears et al., Whites' Opposition to "Busing".
Self-Interest orSymbolic Politics?73 AM. POL. SCL REV. 369 (1979) (concluding
that self-interest had little or no effect on White hostility toward busing
children for the purpose of racially integrating public schools).
175 Professor Kent Tedin reached a similar conclusion in his study of two

Houston-area school districts affected by a court-ordered school financing
reform.
Kent Tedin, Self-Interest, Symbolic Values and the Financial
Equalizationof the Public Schools, 56 J. POL. 628, 646-47 (1994).
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poverty. In this way, parents of school-age children may see
school finance equalization through the lens of racial politics
rather than through taxation policy.
One must also keep in mind the multivalence of school finance politics in New Jersey in 1990. Different groups opposed
the QEA for different reasons. For the population at large, race
had little to do with the opposition to, or support for, the Quality Education Act. Instead, the perceived economic impact of the
new financing system largely determined support or opposition.176 However, for parents (particularly parents of public
school children) other issues were more determinative, and the
evidence
indicates that one of these more salient cleavages was
7
race.

17

IV. TAX REVOLT, BACKLASH, AND THE QEA II
As important as public opinion concerning the QEA was in
the summer and fall of 1990, the political and legislative response to a larger tax revolt largely dictated the fate of the
QEA. The organized opposition to the first QEA (as expressed
loudly by affluent districts and by the NJEA, and more quietly
by New Jersey's urban areas) ensured there would be some
modification to the plan in the winter and spring of 1991.18
However, the sweeping changes to the QEA far exceeded those
anticipated by these groups. Indeed, the NJEA, though initially
opposed to the QEA, wound up fighting to keep it. 17 9 The
NJEA opposed the reform bill passed into law by a Democratic
180
majority because "it would place new caps on spending.'
Having prodded for significant revisions, these groups helped

See supra part IV.E.1.
17 See supra part IV.E.2.
178 Governor Florio conceded as much in early November 1990 when he

allowed the Department of Education to engage in planning discussions with
school districts. See Hanley, supra note 123; Hanley, School Officials, supra
note 94. It became a certainty in January when the Democratic leadership in
the General Assembly broke with Florio and introduced its own plan to
overhaul the QEA. See Robert Hanley, Plan to Revise Aid to Schools Deepens
New Jersey Tumult, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1991, at A28 [hereinafter Plan to
Revise].
19 See, e.g., Peter Kerr, SenatePasses Changes in Aid in, FlorioPlan,N.Y.
TIMEs, March 8, 1991, at B2.
180 Id.
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initiate8 revisions that soon exceeded their own goalsfears.1 '

or

The calls for reform initiated a new round of policy-making,
but under a completely changed political climate. The neardefeat of U.S. Senator Bill Bradley by political neophyte Christine Todd Whitman in November 1990 showed both Florio and
New Jersey state legislators that voters were willing to punish
legislators for raising taxes in a recessionary economy. 2
Florio himself stated that voters had sent him a "humbling
message" in the November 1990 election.'" He added that
the electoral results "were really directed at me and the policies
of my administration."''
Massive public opposition to the
sales and income tax increases created legislative and electoral
incentives to rescind the benefits of Florio's original fiscal
priorities.'8 5 The hostility generated by Florio's tax package
created a legislative rush to reform the QEA and to replace aid
to inner-city districts with middle class property tax relief.'8 6
Legislators, fearful of the wrath of New Jersey's voters in the
upcoming November 1991 elections, sought to present a more
tax-friendly face to a crucial voting bloc - suburban voters who
were pinched both by tax increases and by looming cuts in state
aid to their school districts." 7 The legislative results, the
Quality Education Act of 1991 (QEA 11)18 and the Supplemen-

tal Municipal Property Tax Relief Act,'89 produced a significant shift in the distribution of school aid from urban districts
to suburban districts, both middle class and affluent. 9 ' These

181See id.
182 Kerr, supra note 71.
18

3 Id.

184Id.

18' Bogart & VanDoren, supra note 69, at 360-71; see also Mintrom, supra

note 146, at 852.
186 See Hanley, supra note 178; Wayne King, Bill to Cut Florio'sAid to
Schools is Gaining,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1991, at B1.
187 Bogart

& VanDoren, supra note 69, at 360-71.

188 Quality Education Act of 1991, ch. 62, 1991 N.J. Laws 200 (codified at
N.J. STAT ANN. § 18A:7D (West Supp. 1994)).
189 Supplemental Municipal Property Tax Relief Act, ch. 63, §§ 3, 9, 1991
N.J. Laws 231, 232, 234 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§52:27D-118.34, 118.40
(West Supp. 1994)).
9
' The two bills worked in conjunction to accomplish this. The Quality
Education Act of 1991, ch. 62, § 3(b), 1991 N.J. Laws 207 (codified at N.J.
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modifications did not, however, eliminate increases to the
special needs districts,19 ' although they reduced the size of the
increase, primarily to grant property tax relief to suburban
homeowners. 92
In early January 1991, New Jersey Senate President John
Lynch and Senate Majority Leader Daniel Dalton introduced a
plan to cut back the QEA's $1.1 billion price tag by $450 million
and to apply the funds to property tax relief. 93 Under the
Lynch-Dalton plan, the thirty special needs districts would lose
$170 million of the total $450 million cut. 94 Florio administration officials claimed they were surprised by the size of the
proposed cutbacks and hoped to reduce the figure to between
$150 and $200 million. 195
In an attempt to forestall huge cuts to the QEA, Florio
joined a proposal put forth in mid-February 1991 by Speaker of
the Assembly Joseph Doria.' 96 The Doria plan would have
provided only $244 million in property tax relief, instead of
Lynch-Dalton's $395 million, and would have obtained the funds
from the transition aid suburban districts were scheduled to
receive under the QEA. 197 It also would have protected most
of the aid to the state's thirty special needs districts.'98 In response to this proposal Senator Lynch stated, "The plan appears
to be strongly weighted in favor of the urban centers at the

STAT. ANN.

§ 18A.7D-6 (West Supp. 1994)), not only reduced the foundation

aid level from $6,835 to $6,640, but it also imposed "equity spending caps" on
the special needs districts and thereby limited the amount of money they
would receive. Id. § 14. The money freed up by these changes was then
applied toward property tax relief in the Supplemental Municipal Property
Tax Relief Act, supra note 189.
191See generally GOERTZ, supra note 75, at 14 and 26 for a clear explanation.
192 Supplemental Municipal Property Tax Relief Act, supra note 189.
193

Hanley, supra note 178; King, supra note 186.

'9

Hanley, supra note 178.

195 id.

Kerr, supra note 179; Peter Kerr, Trenton Officials Reach Pact to Alter
Morio School Plan, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 1991, at B2 [hereinafter Trenton
196

Officials].
Peter Kerr, Legislator Offers Option on Taxes and School Subsidy in
New Jersey, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1991, at B2.
197

198

Id.
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expense of the suburbs.... I must say the plan leaves me

disappointed."'99
After Doria put forward his proposal, negotiations between
the Florio administration and the legislative leadership soon
closed, and Florio conceded much ground."' On March 4,
state legislative leaders announced a compromise on QEA
IH.2"1 The total amount of aid shifted from the QEA to property tax relief was $355 million." 2 Other objections to the QEA
also were resolved: local assumption of Social Security and
pension payments was deferred for two years, and the minimum
tax effort for property-poor districts was relaxed. °s Within a
week the plan passed both houses, and Florio signed the bill on
March 14.204 At the bill-signing ceremony, Senator Lynch
stated that "The people who pay property taxes in this
state ...made us do the type of reform that we arrived at here,

and made us put in place a system that will work for
2 5 the shortterm and for the long-term for property tax relief. 1
The QEA II reduced the state's infusion of new money into
education by $355 million, but that reduction was not evenly
dispersed among all districts in the state. 206 The thirty special needs districts lost $238 million, which accounted for approximately sixty-seven percent of the cutback. 2 7 Although the
QEA II represented a $750 million increase in state spending
for education over the 1990-91 school year, °5 it basically restored the status quo ante distribution of those educational

199Id.

See Trenton Officials, supra note 196.

200

201 Id.
202 Although newspaper reports at the time indicated the shift was $360

million, Goertz's calculations show it was $355 million. GOERTZ, supra note 75,
at 27 (Table 5). The Supplemental Municipal Property Tax Relief Act did
appropriate $360 million for tax relief, however. Supplemental Municipal
Property Tax Relief Act, supra note 189, at § 20.
203 Peter Kerr, Florio School Aid Plan Cut; Homeowners Get Tax Relief,
N.Y. TIMEs, March 12, 1991, at B3.
204 Kathleen Bird, Abbott Lawyer Set to Challenge QEA Overhaul; Says
Plan To Use Funds for Tax Relief Violates Court's Mandate, N.J. L.J., March
28, 1991, at 3.
205
Id.
20 GOERTZ,
20

supra note 75, at 25 (Table 4A), 27 (Table 5).

1 d. at 25 (Table 4A).

208

Id. at 27 (Table 5).
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resources. The first QEA advocated a larger slice of the educational pie to inner-city schools, but the QEA II, although it
increased the overall size of the pie, actually shrank or kept
constant the slice of the pie for New Jersey's special needs districts." 9 For example, before the QEA passed, the thirty special needs districts received 36.9% of the Total Maximum School
Aid fund during the 1990-91 school year. 1 If the first QEA
had been implemented they would have received about 39.4% of
the Total Maximum School Aid fund; under QEA II, they received only 37.2%.11

Within certain categories of funding

those percentages declined below pre-QEA levels. For example,
in the 1990-91 school year the thirty special needs districts
received 52.1% of all foundation aid. 12 Under the QEA, foundation aid would have grown to 53.8%, but under the QEA H
they received only 47.7%.213 At best, the QEA IE left the thirty special needs districts in roughly the same position vis-A-vis
the other districts in the state as they were prior to the Abbott
II decision. 1 4
The QEA II, then, provided a double hit to the special needs
districts in the New Jersey. The tax relief measure aided
largely suburban homeowners, and the QEA II's redistribution
of educational funds primarily benefitted the non-special needs
districts. 15 Although the overall spending went up under the
QEA II, that aid did not increase the slice of the pie allocated to
the special needs districts.
Because legislators responded sharply to the vocal demands
both of organized interests and of popular pressure, the redistribution effected by the original QEA became politically untenable. After Senator Bradley's near defeat, legislators saw that
the popular outrage over the QEA and its attendant tax increas-

209

Id. at 26.

21 0

Id. Total Maximum School Aid is money spent by the state on elementary and secondary education. For the years discussed here, it does not
include some de minimis sums, such as debt service aid.
211
Id. at 26 (Table 4B).
212
Id. Foundation aid is the general equalization fund and largely is unrestricted, unlike categorical state funds which must be spent on particular programs.
213 id.
2141d.

215

See Kerr, supra note 203.
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es had potentially disastrous electoral results.2 16 However,
their efforts to appease an angry electorate appear to have
failed.21 7 In November 1991, eight months after the passage
of the QEA II and its property tax rebates, voters replaced
Democratic control in the New Jersey legislature with a vetoproof Republican majority." 8 The Democrats lost ten seats in
the Senate and twenty-one seats in the Assembly. This put the
Republicans in absolute control of both houses for the first time
in twenty years.2 19

One analysis of the voters' reaction to the QEA and to the
QEA II indicates that the QEA II did little to alter the
electorate's mood.2 20 Using household-level income and property tax data, Bogart and VanDoren modeled the 1991 state
Senate election to determine whether voters punished New
Jersey state legislators for voting against their constituents'
economic interests.22' After regressing the percentage vote obtained by a candidate in the election against whether the
legislator voted in favor of the QEA, the candidate's party and
incumbent status, whether the candidate was unopposed, as
well as the effect of the QEA on household income, Bogart and
VanDoren concluded that the QEA II revisions did little to alter
the voters' candidate selection.2 22 Indeed, "[t]he legislators'
attempt to curry favor with their constituents through revisions
to the QEA that diluted its redistributive character was discounted by voters whose reactions toward incumbents were
governed mainly by the senators' behavior toward the original
QEA in June 1990.''21 Instead of being appeased by the QEA
II, voters appear to have been deeply angry at Democrats and
simply voted them out of office. In an electoral sense, the
legislative changes to the QEA were for naught.

216

Senate President John Lynch, in particular, felt strongly about ap-

peasing middle-class anger. Id.
217
See Bogart & VanDoren, supra note 69, at 372.
21
1

See King, supra note 71.

219

Id.

220 See, e.g., Bogart & VanDoren, supra note 69.
22 1

Id.at 357-58.

222

Id.at 371.

223
id.
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V. A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF
ABBOTT II AND THE QEA ON
SCHOOL FINANCE EQUALITY IN NEW JERSEY
Despite the revisions and amendments passed in 1991 and
1992, the Quality Education Act remains the statutory response
to the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Abbott II. Additionally, despite the public opposition it faced, the divisions
within New Jersey politics it created, and the electoral defeats
to which it contributed, the QEA's central importance for the
New Jersey Supreme Court lies in its direct effect on the equity
of school funding in New Jersey.2" In order to determine this
effect, one must examine the Act's impact on the actual distribution of funds in New Jersey over an extended period of time.
This section explores in quantitative terms the relative success
and failure of the QEA to achieve parity between affluent
suburban districts and generally poor inner-city districts, a
parity the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly declared to be
its primary objective in the Abbott II decision."2 5 The court
explicitly ruled unconstitutional the level of education offered in
those twenty-eight inner-city districts designated by the New
Jersey Department of Education as having the lowest socioeconomic status within the state - District Factor Groups A
and B. 26 As discussed in Part II above, Abbott 11 requires
that educational resources in those districts be equalized with
the resources in the most affluent districts in the
state - districts in District Factor Groups I and J. Specifically,
the court ruled that the existing school financing law
must be amended, or new legislation passed, so as to
assure that poorer urban districts' educational funding
is substantially equal to that of property-rich districts.... The level of funding must also be adequate to
provide for the special educational needs of these poorer urban districts and address their extreme disadvantages.

224 Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 409-10 (1990).

m Id. at 408.
at 387.
7
2 Id. at 408.
26 Id.
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By examining a number of equality measures over time, one can
trace the effectiveness of the court's decision to bring together
the educational resources of these two groups.
Before turning to the findings of this analysis, discussion of
some methodological difficulties confronting a quantitative
comparison of funding levels for the A and B districts and for
the I and J districts is necessary. One problem immediately
confronted is that many of the affluent I and J districts are not
K-12 (kindergarten through grade twelve) school districts.
Many towns in New Jersey have K-6 or K-8 schools and then
send their children to a regional high school.2" In contrast,
all of the special needs districts are K-12 districts. When
confronted with districts of different grade levels, a researcher
has two choices: "[Elxamine each type of district separately, or
combine the data of high school districts and their 'feeder'
elementary districts to form fictitious K-12 districts. ' 229 The
first choice was not viable in this instance because there are no
K-6 or K-8 special needs districts. Thus, in order to render
these districts comparable, .hypothetical K-12 districts were
constructed from those I and J non-K-12 districts that enroll
their high school students in a common regional high school. By
adding enrollments and funding levels for all constituent K-6 or
K-8 districts to the regional high school enrollments and funding levels, hypothetical districts were created that are comparable to the other K-12 districts in the state. By constructing
these districts, approximately ninety-five percent of all students
enrolled in the I and J districts and the special needs districts
were included in the analysis. 3 0
A second problem is defining the group of districts that fall
into the I and J categories. According to the New Jersey Department of Education's 1980 classification, there were 118 I
and J districts (K-6, K-8, K-12 and regional high schools (both

228 The annual NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT DATA BOOK, supra note

51, provides information on every school district in the state, including each
district's grade levels and factor groups.
229 BERNE & STIEFEL, supra note 55, at 46-47.

210The remaining five percent were enrolled in affluent I and J districts
that were part of a regional high school that was not classified as an I or J
district by the New Jersey Department of Education. See NEW JERSEY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT DATA BOOK, supra note 51. Omitted from the analysis,
in other words, are the K-6 or K-8 districts that are I and J districts but which
are part of a regional high school that is a G or H district, and thus not
subject to the Abbott II ruling.
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7-12 and 9-12)).231 According to the 1990 classification, there
were 132 such districts. If one considers those that were listed
in either the 1980 or 1990 classification, the total rises to 144
districts. In order to include as many districts as possible, all
districts that were included in either the 1980 or 1990 classification were used herein. This group was somewhat restricted,
however, since it included only the K-12 or hybrid K-12 districts
for a total of seventy-eight I and J (affluent) districts.
At the other end of the classification scale, there are only
twenty-eight districts included in the District Factor Groups A
and B. Upon passage of the first QEA, the New Jersey legislature added two additional districts to this "special needs" categoryY 2 Thus, the analysis includes thirty almost exclusively
urban and heavily minority special needs districts and seventyeight I and J districts (K-12 or hybrid K-12). Together, these
108 districts enrolled approximately 450,000 of the 1.36 million
students enrolled in New Jersey public schools during the 199394 academic year.1
The third problem involves which school financing object to
measure. Net budget revenues reveal the amount of money
available to a district, but do not disclose how a district allocated those funds among competing programs. The Abbott 11 court
was less concerned, however, with ensuring that districts spent
their resources on identical programs (different districts, after
all, have different needs) than with ensuring that districts had
similar financing available to use as they saw fitY 4 Thus,
one must examine net budget revenues.
The decision also made clear that the state needed to
address the particular educational hardships of the special
needs districts. 5 The legislature sought to meet this court
mandate in two ways. First, the special needs districts were
allocated an additional five percent of foundation aid over the

"1These school district classifications were included with the financing
data set obtained from the New Jersey Department of Education, Finance
Division. In Abbott II, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the 1980 I
and J classification. Abbott II, 575 A-2d at 408-09.
22 Quality Education Act of 1990, ch. 52, § 3.
Telephone interview with Linda Jones, Research Department, New
Jersey Education Association (April 7, 1994).
2 Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 409-10 (1990).
2 5 Id. at 408-09.
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non-special needs districts.2 36 Second, the reformulation of
the compensatory education program into an at-risk aid program was designed to channel more funds into those districts
that faced poverty in the home. Thus, in order to determine
whether the QEA equalized the funds for regular educational
programs, one must omit the at-risk aid from the equality
measures. This is done for the coefficient of variation and Gini
index measures described below.
Turning now to this analysis, Figure Seven 7 shows the
high, low, and mean per pupil net budget revenues for the years
1988 through 1993."8 Each district's per pupil net budget
revenue figures are weighted for district enrollment and expressed in constant 1993 dollars.23 9 The chart shows a widening spread between the high and low ends of the financing scale
and an annually increasing mean. In constant dollars, the
mean doubled over this six year period. The only year in which
the range decreased was 1993. Looking closely at Figure Seven,
one can see a noticeable jump in the bottom district and a
leveling off of the rate of increase for the top district in 1993.
This produced the one year in which the spread between the top
and bottom districts actually decreased in constant dollars.
The problem with the range measure is that it registers
only the changes at two locations, the district with the highest
revenues and the district with the lowest. A different measure
that registers all transfers among districts is the coefficient of
variation, which is the standard deviation of revenues among all
districts divided by the mean. Figure Eight' ° shows the
trend in the coefficient of variation over the six year period for
both the per pupil net budget revenues and the per pupil net
budget revenues minus at-risk aid. In Figure Eight, the lines
are basically flat until 1992, the first year the QEA was implemented. 4 The QEA's second year saw an even sharper drop

Quality Education Act of 1990 § 6a.
28

See app. infra at 196.
Net budget revenues are the combination of state aid and local tax reve-

nues. Federal aid is not included. State aid includes both aid for regular
education, as well as categorical aid, such as aid for transportation, special
education, etc.
" These 1993 figures must be considered preliminary because they have
not yet been audited.
-4o

241

See app. infra at 197.
Quality Education Act of 1990 § 4.
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in the overall levels of inequality. Clearly the QEA had a
notable influence on the inequality between the I and J districts
and the special needs districts. However, when one omits the
at-risk aid, the overall level of inequality increases. This indicates that the plan uses at-risk aid to even out total revenues
among affluent and poor districts, when the aid should be used
to boost the revenues for the poor districts above those of the
affluent I and J districts. Although revenues targeted at regular education expenses have seen an improvement in equality in
the first two years under the QEA, the New Jersey Supreme
Court's additional mandate that the legislature address the
special needs of the poor, inner-city districts has not been met.
Thus, even when taking into account aid designed to give them
a modest head start, poor, inner-city districts have not been able
to match the resources of affluent suburban districts.
Figure Nine 2 tells a similar story when one uses a Gini
index to ascertain levels of equality.'
What is striking here
is the roughly equal drop in percentage terms in the level of
inequality as with the coefficient of variation. The Gini index
and the coefficient of variation reflect the same improvement in
equality. Both measures reveal a basically flat line until 1992
(the first year of the QEA's implementation) and a significant
improvement in equality for 1992 and 1993.
Thus, the QEA appears to have improved significantly the
equality of educational resources available for regular education.
However, this examination is not an equity study of all districts
in New Jersey, but only those that are the focus of the court's
ruling. Inclusion of more middle to upper-middle class districts,
which were omitted from this analysis, could increase the Gini
and coefficient of variation scores described here.
One must also note the difference between the "substantially equal" demand imposed by the New Jersey Supreme Court
and the further requirement that the state respond in explicit
financial terms to the special educational needs of the poorest
districts in the state. Although there has been some improvement, the QEA thus far has not produced the "substantially
equal" levels of funding called for by Abbott II. Obviously the
second mandate of the court has not been met. Moreover, the

See app. infra at 198.
For an account of the use and calculation of a Gini index and coefficient
of variation, see BERNE & STIEFEL, supranote 55, at 56-59, 67-71.
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current improvement may not be sustainable given the recent
developments in New Jersey politics outlined below.
VI. THE QEA: ON THE ROAD TO EQUALITY
OR AT THE HIGH WATER MARK?
What can be learned from the twin sagas of Abbott II and
the QEA? Early results show that the court produced some
meaningful gains for equality between the most affluent and the
most impoverished school districts. However, the story of courtinitiated school finance reform in New Jersey has not ended.
The early success of the QEA would have been even more
pronounced had the state legislature not undertaken revisions
to produce property tax relief. Instead, legislators responded to
public outcry and reduced state equalization aid, and political
pressures to further scale back state aid continue to mount.
To date, the voters' demands have been met. In the Spring
of 1994 Governor Christine Todd Whitman proposed, and the
legislature approved, only a $28 million increase to the thirty
special needs districts - much less than the $115 million the
The Quality Education Act is
QEA provided in 1993.'
dead. 2 ' Nonetheless, the reasons for its origin still exist. The
recent Abbott III decision requires that the legislature enact by
September 1996 legislation that ensures parity between the
special needs districts and the affluent districts in District
Factor Groups I and j. 246 The estimated cost of bridging the
24 7 Govgap between these districts is currently $450 million.
ernor Whitman has not announced how she plans to raise this
money and is not expected to provide details until she releases
her budget proposal for 1995-96. 248

' Robert Hanley, Tortuous Course to EqualSchools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1994, at B26.
" Indeed, in the Abbott III decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
admitted as much: "The State informs us that it does not anticipate that the
[Quality Education] Act in its present form will continue to control financing
of public education." Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994) (Abbott
III).
246 Abbott III, 643 A.2d at 576-77.
247 Mary Ellen Schoonmaker, Beyond School Funding;Panel Says Tie Aid
to Tangible Results, THE RECORD (Trenton, N.J.), Oct. 23, 1994, at A29.
" Neal Thompson, School Leaders Urge Funding Review, THE RECORD
(Trenton, N.J.), Oct. 27, 1994, at A6.
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Other legislators, however, introduced proposals that would
eliminate the local property tax as a funding mechanism for
public education."4 Last year, Michigan adopted this seemingly drastic approach to educational financing,2 5 and now
some New Jersey legislators are looking to the Michigan plan as
a model. 5 ' Although it is not clear how this proposal would
meet the court's mandate, it is clear that eliminating local
property taxes as a method of funding schools would go a long
way toward ensuring greater parity among New Jersey's school
districts. A primary danger of this proposal, however, is that it
could easily diminish the overall level of funding for New Jersey
education. That, clearly, is not in the interests of New Jersey
schoolchildren, regardless of the district in which they live. The
backlash against the Quality Education Act survives as a
backlash against spending for public education in all districts.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court, as the findings
here show, has been able to equalize the expenditures among
affluent districts and their inner-city neighbors, it has done so
at a tremendous political risk, not only to elected officials but to
public education as a whole. The next round of legislation will
reveal not only whether there is any meaningful political support left for equalization, but also whether public education in
New Jersey is threatened by the state's angry anti-tax mood.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, thus far, remains above the
fray, and has achieved some substantial results. However,
there is an equally substantial risk inherent in its decisions,
because the court's efforts to ensure meaningful educational
equality among the state's poorest and most affluent districts
may diminish in the long run the resources available to all
children. In the conflict between the court and the people over
the cost of equality, a larger battle brews over the nature of
public education.

29

S.B. 1417, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. (1994).

250 In 1993 the Michigan legislature eliminated, with significant exceptions,

local property taxes for public education. See H.B. 4279 and H.B. 4285, 87th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993). Michigan voters then opted in March, 1994, to rely on
an increased sales tax rather than on an income tax to replace the $7 billion
lost with the elimination of the property tax. Michigan Voters Favor Sales
Tax; School-Funding ProposalDeemed Lesser of Two Evils, CIE. TRIB., Mar.
16, 1994, at 24.
251 Charles Young, GOPBills Aim atAverting School FundingCrisis in '96,
THE REcoRD (Hackensack, N.J.), Sept. 7, 1994, at A3.
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